GMT's Flawed
Arguments - Setting the Record Straight
September 17, 2023
Pipestone Perspectives on GMT's Claims
Pipestone also wishes to set the record straight on claims made by Atlanta, Georgia-based GMT Capital Corp. ("GMT") against this value-creating transaction. Shareholders of Pipestone ("Shareholders") should be wary that there is nothing new in GMT's dissident proxy circular dated September 15, 2023, which focuses on cherry-picked data, nor does GMT have a value-enhancing plan for the standalone Company. GMT's argument can be summarized as nothing more than "kill the deal and hope for the best." But hope is not a strategy the Board and Pipestone can support. Neither should Shareholders.
In Conclusion
- A significant number of GMT's claims are based on personal views, "beliefs" and "feels", whereas the process undertaken by the Board and its Special Committee was rigorousand extensive(see Background to the Arrangement in the Circular)
- Supportedby Pipestone's Special Committee and the Board of Directors
- Supportedby Pipestone's management team, who signed support agreements
- Supportedby Riverstone, Pipestone's largest shareholder (holding approximately 38% of Pipestone shares)
- Two fairness opinions, from BMO Capital Markets and Raymond James
- Recommended by ISS and Glass Lewis, two independent parties, who have recommended voting FOR the transaction
Shareholders should make a choice based on the Board's recommendation underpinned by rigorous analysis,
comprehensive process, and Pipestone's management's robust professional assessment of Pipestone's
standalone prospects and both ISS and Glass Lewis' recommendations, not based on GMT's feelings and beliefs.
Vote FOR the Arrangement
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Reasons For and Anticipated Benefits of the Arrangement
- Continued Ownership Stake in a Highly Differentiated Producer
- Achieves the Size and Scale Required for Market Relevance
- Significantly Increases Reserve Life versus Pipestone as a Standalone Entity
- Increased Growth Potential versus Pipestone as a Standalone Entity
- Enhanced Free Cash Flow Profile versus Standalone Pipestone
- Combined Entity Has Lower Technical Risk than Pipestone as a Standalone Entity
- Combined Entity is Expected to have an Extended Tax Horizon versus Standalone Pipestone
- Other Alternatives Extensively Solicited and Considered
- Other Alternatives are Unfavourable
- Strong Pipestone Shareholder and Management Support
- ISS and Glass Lewis Recommend Voting In Favor of the Transaction
- BMO Fairness Opinion and Raymond James Fairness Opinion
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GMT Proxy Arguments
GMT ARGUMENTS | PIPESTONE RESPONSES | |
Production & Cash Flow Contribution | ||
"I direct you to two simple measures of what Pipestone would be contributing to the new | ⚫ GMT's "simple" analysis is flawed as it is based on single point estimates, and fails to take | |
into account the long-term value and risks of both Pipestone and Strathcona. Relative | ||
entity. First, from a production standpoint, Pipestone would be contributing 35 MBOED of 185 | ||
valuation, which is based on long-term outlooks, not single point estimates, is the most | ||
MBOED proforma production, which is 18.9%. The ratio may even be worse for Pipestone | ||
appropriate measure of an exchange ratio. Analysis that is based on values assigned by | ||
shareholders as it is based on forward-looking estimates for Strathcona versus production | ||
independent reserves evaluators is the most appropriate way to assess exchange ratio. | ||
levels already achieved and reported by Pipestone. Strathcona only produced 144 MBOED in | ||
On that basis, the exchange ratio delivers fair value to Pipestone. | ||
the second quarter of 2023 while Pipestone produced 36.8 MBOED during the same quarter | ||
(adjusted to add back 3.7 MBOED of production lost due to Alberta wildfires during the | ◼ Pipestone contributes ~8.8% based on YE 2022 2P PV 10 after tax, net of debt as of | |
quarter) or 20.4%." | 6/30/2023 as compared to pro forma equity ownership of 8.87% and 9.05% on the | |
"Second, from a cash flow standpoint, a Canadian sell-side financial institution projected in a | basic and fully diluted basis, respectively, making the exchange ratio attractive to | |
Pipestone shareholders | ||
report about the Strathcona acquisition published on August 1, 2023, that Pipestone would | ||
⚫ | Assessment should look at other metrics including reserve value, RLI and long-term | |
provide 14.2% of the combined projected cashflow ($313M of $2,210M total for 2024). These | ||
growth potential | ||
metrics suggest that the exchange ratio for Pipestone should be substantially higher." | ||
"Clearly this is a very accretive transaction for Strathcona shareholders and conversely a very | ◼ Pipestone RLI is 18 years compared to pro forma company of 38(1) | |
dilutive deal for Pipestone Shareholders." | ||
Product Mix | ||
"Sure, Strathcona is oilier, but much of its oil is classified as bitumen or heavy oil, which has | ⚫ Pipestone is gas weighted, which has lower margins than heavy oil | |
lower margins than lighter oil assets." | ⚫ | Pipestone's unhedged operating netback for Q2 2023 averaged $19.51/boe; Strathcona's |
"A significant part of both production and cash flow at Pipestone comes from condensate, | operating netback was 81% higher at $35.30/boe for the same period | |
⚫ | Further, bitumen/heavy oil producers generally trade at higher trading multiples than gas | |
which is a high netback premium product in short supply for blending with heavy oil to make it | ||
producers due to lower decline rates, multi-decade reserve life and lower maintenance | ||
more transportable and saleable." | ||
capital requirements | ||
1. YE 2022 proved plus probable reserve life vs. current production (35,000 boe/d for Pipestone, 185,000 boe/d for Strathcona Pro Forma).
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GMT Proxy Arguments (Cont'd)
GMT ARGUMENTS | PIPESTONE RESPONSES | |
Organic Growth | ||
"While the Waterous team did an excellent job assembling assets acquired at the lows of the | ⚫ Organic growth does not equal growth in value. In fact, one of the reasons why the | |
Pipestone Board undertook a strategic review is because, despite significant organic | ||
market and is to be commended for the equity value they have created for their shareholders, | ||
growth, Pipestone's share price has remained relatively flat since its public debut | ||
Strathcona has shown no organic growth thus far. For instance, since the last acquisition that | ||
($2.40/sh close on January 5, 2019, versus $2.72/sh just prior to announcement). | ||
Strathcona closed in the third quarter of 2022 (the acquisition of Serafina Energy Ltd.), | ||
production has remained flat at 143-144 MBOED over the past three consecutive quarters. | ⚫ GMT's proposed plan to wait some more and hope for the best has been tried and did not | |
Additionally, oil sand and heavy oil projects tend to be lumpier and more capital intensive than | deliver value for various reasons, including Pipestone's asset characteristics. Hope is not | |
Montney development. Pipestone has grown totally organically since 2019…" | a plan. | |
⚫ Board's 18-month extensive and thorough strategic review culminated in the Arrangement | ||
with Strathcona, which both management and Board believe is in the best interests of | ||
Pipestone and its shareholders | ||
⚫ Strathcona has delivered significant organic growth throughout its history, at the same | ||
time as growing through acquisitions; Strathcona's standalone production has recently | ||
exceeded 155 Mboe / d, and is expected to exit 2023 at approximately 160 Mboe / d | ||
Leverage | ||
"Pipestone has grown totally organically since 2019 and has relatively little net debt of $172.4 | ⚫ Leverage for the pro forma company on a 2024 EBITDA basis (~0.9x)(1) is slightly above | |
peers at close, but generally in line with closing leverage for public peers that recently | ||
million (0.5x Net Debt/TTM Adjusted EBITDA), compared to the $3.2 billion of net debt for | ||
completed acquisitions | ||
Strathcona (2.1x Net Debt/TTM Adjusted EBITDA)." | ||
Share Price Performance | ||
"The markets seem to agree as Pipestone Share prices are down 7.4% from $2.72 on July 31, | ⚫ Pipestone's stock underperformed the market only in the period post announcement when | |
little information was known about Strathcona or the pro forma business; post publishing | ||
2023, the day before the Strathcona-Pipestone Arrangement was publicly announced, to | ||
the Management Information Circular on August 25, 2023, which provided additional | ||
$2.52 as of market close on September 14, 2023. On the same timeframe, shares of Crescent | ||
detail on Strathcona, Pipestone's stock has increased 22%, while Crescent Point, Kelt | ||
Point Energy Corp., Kelt Exploration Ltd. and NuVista Energy Ltd., which surround Pipestone | ||
and NuVista increased 7%, 10% and 14%, respectively | ||
and are the most strategic potential owners of Pipestone, are up 8.0%, 16.0% and 18.5%, | ||
respectively." | ||
1. | Based on Pipestone management estimated year-end 2023 leverage ratio to 2024E EBITDA. |
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Disclaimer
Pipestone Energy Corp. published this content on 18 September 2023 and is solely responsible for the information contained therein. Distributed by Public, unedited and unaltered, on 18 September 2023 03:03:02 UTC.